Strategy-proof assignment with fair compensation

研究成果: Article査読

3 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

We study the problem of allocating heterogeneous indivisible objects (e.g. jobs, houses, etc.) when monetary compensations are possible. We present a new family of strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms. Each mechanism in the family is a variation of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves pivotal mechanism: the planner selects tentative compensations associated with the indivisible objects and implements the pivotal mechanism for the objects with tentative compensations. We characterize this family as the "Pareto dominant" class of strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms in the two-agent case.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)215-226
ページ数12
ジャーナルMathematical social sciences
50
2
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2005 9

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 社会学および政治科学
  • 社会科学(全般)
  • 心理学(全般)
  • 統計学、確率および不確実性

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