Strategy-proof and Pareto efficient allocation of indivisible goods: general impossibility domains

研究成果: Article査読

抄録

We consider the problem of allocating several homogeneous indivisible goods when monetary transfers among agents are possible. We study the possibility of constructing strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanisms on restricted domains of agents’ valuation profiles. We show that there is no strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanism under the weak domain condition that all agents’ sets of possible valuations share at least four common valuations satisfying a certain inequality. Moreover, we prove that this impossibility result is robust to any affine transformation of domains, and we examine this impossibility result when the set of agent’s possible valuations consists of finite integers.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)419-432
ページ数14
ジャーナルInternational Journal of Game Theory
50
2
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2021 6

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 統計学および確率
  • 数学(その他)
  • 社会科学(その他)
  • 経済学、計量経済学
  • 統計学、確率および不確実性

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