Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies: A note

Rajat Deb, Shinji Ohseto

研究成果: Article査読

7 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

Serizawa [3] characterized the set of strategy-proof, individually rational, no exploitative, and non-bossy social choice functions in economies with pure public goods. He left an open question whether non-bossiness is necessary for his characterization. We will prove that non-bossiness is implied by the other three axioms in his characterization.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)685-689
ページ数5
ジャーナルEconomic Theory
14
3
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 1999 11
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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