Practical results of em cartography on a FPGA-based RSA hardware implementation

Laurent Sauvage, Sylvain Guilley, Jean Luc Danger, Naofumi Homma, Yu-Ichi Hayashi

研究成果: Conference contribution

3 引用 (Scopus)

抜粋

Side channel attack is a powerful technique to extracting secret key from cryptographic applications of embedded systems. Best results are obtained by placing a small electromagnetic probe just over areas of an integrated circuit which are leaking the most information. To find such locations, some cartography methods have been proposed in the past, but never used against asymmetric-key cryptosystems. In this paper, we target such cryptosystem, more precisely a FPGA-based RSA hardware implementation. We show that these methods are effective to locate the RSA cryptoprocessor.

元の言語English
ホスト出版物のタイトルEMC 2011 - Proceedings
ホスト出版物のサブタイトル2011 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility
ページ768-772
ページ数5
DOI
出版物ステータスPublished - 2011 10 24
イベント2011 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility, EMC 2011 - Long Beach, CA, United States
継続期間: 2011 8 142011 8 19

出版物シリーズ

名前IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility
ISSN(印刷物)1077-4076

Other

Other2011 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility, EMC 2011
United States
Long Beach, CA
期間11/8/1411/8/19

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Condensed Matter Physics
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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  • これを引用

    Sauvage, L., Guilley, S., Danger, J. L., Homma, N., & Hayashi, Y-I. (2011). Practical results of em cartography on a FPGA-based RSA hardware implementation. : EMC 2011 - Proceedings: 2011 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility (pp. 768-772). [6038412] (IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility). https://doi.org/10.1109/ISEMC.2011.6038412