Pollution control in open Economies: Implications of within-period interactions for dynamic game equilibrium

Akihiko Yanase

    研究成果: Article査読

    8 被引用数 (Scopus)

    抄録

    This paper examines a two-country, dynamic game model of pollution control in the presence of economic interactions between countries within a period, as well as the environmental interaction between periods (i.e., a change in the stock of global pollution). These economic interactions emerge because of changes in the terms of trade of polluting goods or the market share of domestic polluting industries. It is shown that if within-period externalities exist, a noncooperative equilibrium may result in a smaller stock of global pollution in the steady state than does international cooperation. Moreover, the properties of equilibrium paths depend on the direction and size of such externalities. In addition, trigger strategy equilibria that achieve the outcome of the collusive solution are examined.

    本文言語English
    ページ(範囲)277-311
    ページ数35
    ジャーナルJournal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie
    84
    3
    DOI
    出版ステータスPublished - 2005 5月 1

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • ビジネス、管理および会計(全般)
    • 経済学、計量経済学

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