On the incentive properties of multi-item auctions

研究成果: Article査読

14 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

In a market of indivisible objects where a buyer consumes at most one object, the buyer-optimal auction is a multi-item generalization of Vickrey's second-price auction. If the optimal auction is formulated as a strategic game, it is well-known that it satisfies good incentive properties, i.e., the honest strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium, a unique perfect equilibrium and a dominant strategy equilibrium. For each of the three incentive properties, it is shown that the optimal auction is a unique auction satisfying the property. The uniqueness results are derived in a general setting with budget constraints and non-linear utilities.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)1-19
ページ数19
ジャーナルInternational Journal of Game Theory
27
1
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 1998 5月
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 統計学および確率
  • 数学(その他)
  • 社会科学(その他)
  • 経済学、計量経済学
  • 統計学、確率および不確実性

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