TY - GEN
T1 - On-chip power noise measurements of cryptographic VLSI circuits and interpretation for side-channel analysis
AU - Fujimoto, Daisuke
AU - Miura, Noriyuki
AU - Hayashi, Yu-Ichi
AU - Homma, Naofumi
AU - Hori, Yohei
AU - Katashita, Toshihiro
AU - Sakiyama, Kazuo
AU - Le, Thanh Ha
AU - Bringer, Julien
AU - Bazargan-Sabet, Pirouz
AU - Danger, Jean Luc
PY - 2013/12/24
Y1 - 2013/12/24
N2 - Power noise waveforms within cryptographic VLSI circuits in a 65 nm CMOS technology are captured by using an on-chip voltage waveform monitor (OCM). The waveform measurements emphasize the correlation of dynamic voltage drops to internal logical activities during the processing of Advance Encryption Standard (AES), and resolve the physical processes in the information leakage of such as secret key bytes through Correlated Power Analysis (CPA). The time window of significant importance where the leakage most likely happens is clearly designated within a single clock cycle in the final stage of AES processing. The primary frequency components of power noise in the leakage are shown to be localized within an extremely low frequency region. The level of information leakage is strongly associated with the increase of dynamic voltage drops against increment of the Hamming distance in the AES processing. The on-chip power noise measurements unveil the facts about side-channel information leakage behind the traditional CPA with on-board sensing of power current through a resistor of 1 ohm.
AB - Power noise waveforms within cryptographic VLSI circuits in a 65 nm CMOS technology are captured by using an on-chip voltage waveform monitor (OCM). The waveform measurements emphasize the correlation of dynamic voltage drops to internal logical activities during the processing of Advance Encryption Standard (AES), and resolve the physical processes in the information leakage of such as secret key bytes through Correlated Power Analysis (CPA). The time window of significant importance where the leakage most likely happens is clearly designated within a single clock cycle in the final stage of AES processing. The primary frequency components of power noise in the leakage are shown to be localized within an extremely low frequency region. The level of information leakage is strongly associated with the increase of dynamic voltage drops against increment of the Hamming distance in the AES processing. The on-chip power noise measurements unveil the facts about side-channel information leakage behind the traditional CPA with on-board sensing of power current through a resistor of 1 ohm.
KW - AES
KW - Electromagnetic leakage
KW - Information leakage
KW - Side-channel attack
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84890713733&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84890713733
SN - 9781467349796
T3 - IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility
SP - 405
EP - 410
BT - Proceedings of the 2013 International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility, EMC Europe 2013
T2 - 2013 International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility, EMC Europe 2013
Y2 - 2 September 2013 through 6 September 2013
ER -