Non-dummy agents in pure exchange economies

Miki Kato, Shinji Ohseto

研究成果: Article査読

5 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

We introduce a very fundamental and important axiom of the non-dummy. This states that each agent can change the outcome of the mechanism at some preference profile, thus guaranteeing every agent the minimum right to affect the social decision. We study the possibility of strategy-proof, efficient and non-dummy mechanisms in pure exchange economies. We provide two new interesting classes of such mechanisms, The results shed light on the structure of strategy-proof and efficient mechanisms, and should promote a complete characterization of those mechanisms in pure exchange economies with three or more agents.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)212-220
ページ数9
ジャーナルJapanese Economic Review
55
2
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2004 6
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 経済学、計量経済学

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