Network games with and without synchroneity

Ahmad Termimi Ab Ghani, Kazuyuki Tanaka

研究成果: Conference contribution

4 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

To formulate a network security problem, Mavronicholas et al. [6] introduced a strategic game on an undirected graph whose nodes are exposed to infection by attackers, and whose edges are protected by a defender. Subsequently, MedSalem et al. [9] generalized the model so that they have many defenders instead of a single defender. Then in [1], we introduced a new network game with the roles of players interchanged, and obtained a graph-theoretic characterization of its pure Nash equilibria. In this paper we study mixed Nash equilibria for stochastic strategies in this new game, and then we generalize our network game to an asynchronous game, where two players repeatedly execute simultaneous games. Although the asynchronous game is formally an infinite game, we show that it has a stable solution by reducing it to a finite game.

本文言語English
ホスト出版物のタイトルDecision and Game Theory for Security - Second International Conference, GameSec 2011, Proceedings
ページ87-103
ページ数17
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2011
イベント2nd International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2011 - College Park, MD, United States
継続期間: 2011 11 142011 11 15

出版物シリーズ

名前Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
7037 LNCS
ISSN(印刷版)0302-9743
ISSN(電子版)1611-3349

Other

Other2nd International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2011
国/地域United States
CityCollege Park, MD
Period11/11/1411/11/15

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 理論的コンピュータサイエンス
  • コンピュータ サイエンス(全般)

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