TY - JOUR
T1 - Economic institutions and autocratic breakdown
T2 - Monetary constraints and fiscal spending in dominant-party regimes
AU - Bodea, Cristina
AU - Garriga, Ana Carolina
AU - Higashijima, Masaaki
N1 - Funding Information:
Higashijima acknowledges support from the Zengin Foundation for Studies on Economics and Finance (Tokyo). Garriga acknowledges support from the Mexican National Council for Science and Technology (CONACYT, Convocatoria 291164). Data and supporting materials necessary to reproduce the numerical results in the article are available in the JOP Dataverse (https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/jop). An online appendix with supplementary material is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/701831. 1. We use the terms autocracy, dictatorship, and authoritarianism interchangeably.
Funding Information:
Higashijima acknowledges support from the Zengin Foundation for Studies on Economics and Finance (Tokyo). Garriga acknowledges support from the Mexican National Council for Science and Technology (CONACYT, Convocatoria 291164).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 by the Southern Political Science Association. All rights reserved.
PY - 2019/4/1
Y1 - 2019/4/1
N2 - In dominant-party regimes, party cadres’ participation in decision making constrains dictators from arbitrarily changing policy. Dominant-party regimes are also better at mobilizing supporters in exchange for extensive patronage. The conventional wisdom is that these two mechanisms work together to prolong dominant-party regimes. However, under certain conditions, the elite-level constraints restrict autocratic leaders’ ability to engage in patronage distribution. We focus on monetary institutions, arguing that when central bank independence overlaps with the collective decision making in dominant-party regimes, dictators have diminished control over the central bank. Thus, the central bank is effective enough to restrict expansionary fiscal policy, reducing the mobilization of supporters through patronage and increasing authoritarian breakdown risk. Analyses on data from 1970 to 2012 in 94 autocracies find that high central bank independence in dominant-party regimes increases the likelihood of breakdown. Moreover, independent central banks in party-based autocracies contribute to lower fiscal expenditures.
AB - In dominant-party regimes, party cadres’ participation in decision making constrains dictators from arbitrarily changing policy. Dominant-party regimes are also better at mobilizing supporters in exchange for extensive patronage. The conventional wisdom is that these two mechanisms work together to prolong dominant-party regimes. However, under certain conditions, the elite-level constraints restrict autocratic leaders’ ability to engage in patronage distribution. We focus on monetary institutions, arguing that when central bank independence overlaps with the collective decision making in dominant-party regimes, dictators have diminished control over the central bank. Thus, the central bank is effective enough to restrict expansionary fiscal policy, reducing the mobilization of supporters through patronage and increasing authoritarian breakdown risk. Analyses on data from 1970 to 2012 in 94 autocracies find that high central bank independence in dominant-party regimes increases the likelihood of breakdown. Moreover, independent central banks in party-based autocracies contribute to lower fiscal expenditures.
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U2 - 10.1086/701831
DO - 10.1086/701831
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85062324244
VL - 81
SP - 601
EP - 615
JO - Journal of Politics
JF - Journal of Politics
SN - 0022-3816
IS - 2
ER -