Chosen-input side-channel analysis on unrolled light-weight cryptographic hardware

Ville Yli-Mäyry, Naofumi Homma, Takafumi Aoki

研究成果: Conference contribution

2 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

Lightweight ciphers designed with a fully unrolled architecture, capable of encryption/decryption in a single clock cycle, have gained momentum in the last few years. They've shown that very low latency encryption/decryption is possible with modest costs in comparison with traditional round-based designs. This paper explores how to most efficiently perform side-channel analysis against such unrolled cryptographic hardware in a setting where the adversary may freely choose the plaintexts processed by the target cipher. We present a method for choosing plaintexts for a straightforward recovery of the encryption/decryption key by side-channel analysis without any template attack-like profiling phase of the device. Finally, we demonstrate the validity of our method with experiments on fully unrolled implementations of PRINCE and MANTIS. The result shows that our chosen-input attack is significantly more efficient than the corresponding known-input attacks.

本文言語English
ホスト出版物のタイトルProceedings of the 18th International Symposium on Quality Electronic Design, ISQED 2017
出版社IEEE Computer Society
ページ301-306
ページ数6
ISBN(電子版)9781509054046
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2017 5 2
イベント18th International Symposium on Quality Electronic Design, ISQED 2017 - Santa Clara, United States
継続期間: 2017 3 142017 3 15

出版物シリーズ

名前Proceedings - International Symposium on Quality Electronic Design, ISQED
ISSN(印刷版)1948-3287
ISSN(電子版)1948-3295

Other

Other18th International Symposium on Quality Electronic Design, ISQED 2017
国/地域United States
CitySanta Clara
Period17/3/1417/3/15

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • ハードウェアとアーキテクチャ
  • 電子工学および電気工学
  • 安全性、リスク、信頼性、品質管理

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