Characterizations of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms for Excludable versus Nonexcludable Public Projects

研究成果: Article査読

14 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

First, we characterize "the unanimous mechanisms" as the set of strategy-proof, individually rational, and citizen sovereign mechanisms for the provision of a nonexcludable public project. Second, we characterize "the largest unanimous mechanisms" as the set of strategy-proof, individually rational, demand-monotonic, and access-independent mechanisms for the provision of an excludable public project. Comparing these two classes of mechanisms, we conclude that admitting partial exclusion always improves efficiency under the incentive compatibility constraint. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D71, D82, H41.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)51-66
ページ数16
ジャーナルGames and Economic Behavior
32
1
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2000 7月
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 財務
  • 経済学、計量経済学

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