Amended final-offer arbitration over an uncertain value: A comparison with CA and FOA

Cary Deck, Amy Farmer, Dao Zhi Zeng

研究成果: Article査読

7 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

Arbitration is increasingly employed to resolve disputes. Two arbitration mechanisms, conventional arbitration (CA) and final-offer arbitration (FOA) are commonly utilized, but previous theoretical and empirical research has found that they are unsatisfactory. Several alternative mechanisms have been proposed, but ultimately laboratory research has found that they do not offer an improvement. An exception is amended final-offer arbitration (AFOA), which not only has desirable theoretical properties but also has been demonstrated to outperform FOA in the laboratory. This study provides a direct laboratory comparison of AFOA with CA. Also, by utilizing an environment with an uncertain payoff to one of the parties, this study tests the robustness of AFOA's performance relative to FOA. The results indicate that AFOA does outperform FOA, but that AFOA is only weakly better than CA.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)439-454
ページ数16
ジャーナルExperimental Economics
10
4
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2007 12
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)

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