TY - GEN
T1 - Transient analysis of em radiation associated with information leakage from cryptographic ICs
AU - Hayashi, Yu-Ichi
AU - Homma, Naofumi
AU - Aoki, Takafumi
AU - Okugawa, Yuichiro
AU - Akiyama, Yoshiharu
PY - 2013/1/1
Y1 - 2013/1/1
N2 - This paper presents a time-domain visualization method for tracing electromagnetic (EM) radiation associated with information leakage from cryptographic ICs on the printed circuit board (PCB) surface. In recent years, security threats based on EM analysis attacks on cryptographic devices are attracting considerable attention due to their relative simplicity in practice. Some of the most cost-effective countermeasures against such attacks can be implemented at the PCB level. In order to implement such countermeasures effectively, critical parts (i.e., information sources and information propagation paths) on the board should be identified in advance. The key idea behind this identification is to calculate a correlation between measured EM traces and EM intensity values estimated from correct information (secret key) in the time domain. Transient analysis can reveal information propagation paths even if the EM signal carrying information is weak in comparison with noise generated from other components. Through an experiment, we confirm that EM radiation associated with information leakage can be traced even in situations where the information signal is obscured by background noise.
AB - This paper presents a time-domain visualization method for tracing electromagnetic (EM) radiation associated with information leakage from cryptographic ICs on the printed circuit board (PCB) surface. In recent years, security threats based on EM analysis attacks on cryptographic devices are attracting considerable attention due to their relative simplicity in practice. Some of the most cost-effective countermeasures against such attacks can be implemented at the PCB level. In order to implement such countermeasures effectively, critical parts (i.e., information sources and information propagation paths) on the board should be identified in advance. The key idea behind this identification is to calculate a correlation between measured EM traces and EM intensity values estimated from correct information (secret key) in the time domain. Transient analysis can reveal information propagation paths even if the EM signal carrying information is weak in comparison with noise generated from other components. Through an experiment, we confirm that EM radiation associated with information leakage can be traced even in situations where the information signal is obscured by background noise.
KW - Cryptographic IC
KW - Electromagnetic radiation
KW - Information leakage
KW - Side-chennel attack
KW - Transient analysis
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84897714321&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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U2 - 10.1109/EMCCompo.2013.6735177
DO - 10.1109/EMCCompo.2013.6735177
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84897714321
SN - 9781479923151
T3 - EMC COMPO 2013 Proceedings - 9th International Workshop on Electromagnetic Compatibility of Integrated Circuits
SP - 78
EP - 82
BT - EMC COMPO 2013 Proceedings - 9th International Workshop on Electromagnetic Compatibility of Integrated Circuits
PB - IEEE Computer Society
T2 - 9th International Workshop on Electromagnetic Compatibility of Integrated Circuits, EMC COMPO 2013
Y2 - 15 December 2013 through 18 December 2013
ER -