Abstract
We study the possibility of strategy-proof and efficient mechanisms in pure exchange economies. In his remarkable paper, Zhou (1991) establishes an elegant impossibility result: there is no strategy-proof, efficient, and non-dictatorial mechanism in the two-agent case. He conjectures that there is no strategy-proof, efficient, and "non-inversely-dictatorial" mechanism in the case of three or more agents. However, we discover some counterexamples to his conjecture in the case of four or more agents. We present a new interesting open question: Is there any strategy-proof, efficient, and "non-alternately-dictatorial" mechanism?
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 659-664 |
| Number of pages | 6 |
| Journal | Social Choice and Welfare |
| Volume | 19 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2002 Jul |
| Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
- Economics and Econometrics