Toward general impossibility theorems in pure exchange economies

Miki Kato, Shinji Ohseto

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

17 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study the possibility of strategy-proof and efficient mechanisms in pure exchange economies. In his remarkable paper, Zhou (1991) establishes an elegant impossibility result: there is no strategy-proof, efficient, and non-dictatorial mechanism in the two-agent case. He conjectures that there is no strategy-proof, efficient, and "non-inversely-dictatorial" mechanism in the case of three or more agents. However, we discover some counterexamples to his conjecture in the case of four or more agents. We present a new interesting open question: Is there any strategy-proof, efficient, and "non-alternately-dictatorial" mechanism?

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)659-664
Number of pages6
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume19
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2002 Jul

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Toward general impossibility theorems in pure exchange economies'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this