Strategy-proofness versus symmetry in economies with an indivisible good and money

Miki Kato, Shinji Ohseto, Shohei Tamura

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider the problem of allocating a single indivisible good among n agents when monetary transfers are allowed. We study the possibility of constructing strategy-proof, symmetric, and budget balanced mechanisms.We show that there is no strategy-proof, symmetric, and budget balanced mechanism (under the weak domain condition that the set of agent’s possible valuations includes at least n+1 common valuations). Moreover, this result implies that there is no strategy-proof, symmetric, and budget balanced mechanism (i) in the model where agents may have non-quasilinear preferences, and/or (ii) in the unit-demand model with n heterogeneous indivisible goods.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)195-207
Number of pages13
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume44
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2015 May 13

Keywords

  • Budget balance
  • Indivisible good
  • Monetary transfer
  • Strategy-proofness
  • Symmetry

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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