Strategy-proof mechanisms in public good economies

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In economies with one private good and one public good, the minimal provision mechanism is shown to be the unique mechanism that satisfies strategy-proofness, voluntary participation and the full-range property when a given cost share rule has the convex property. Even if the cost share rule shares positive fixed costs of producing public goods, so includes a non-convex portion, the proper restriction of the range of mechanisms guarantees that the minimal provision mechanism satisfies strategy-proofness and voluntary participation. In contrast, if the restriction is not sufficient, then the implied non-convexity of the cost share rule leads to an impossibility result. Furthermore, we show that no satisfactory mechanism exists in the case with several public goods.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)157-183
Number of pages27
JournalMathematical social sciences
Volume33
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1997 Apr
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Cost share rules
  • Mechanisms
  • Strategy-proofness
  • Voluntary participation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Social Sciences(all)
  • Psychology(all)
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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