Strategy-proof and Pareto efficient allocation of indivisible goods: general impossibility domains

Shinji Ohseto

doi:10.1007/s00182-021-00754-4

Strategy-proof and Pareto efficient allocation of indivisible goods: general impossibility domains

Shinji Ohseto

EEF - Economics and Management

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We consider the problem of allocating several homogeneous indivisible goods when monetary transfers among agents are possible. We study the possibility of constructing strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanisms on restricted domains of agents’ valuation profiles. We show that there is no strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanism under the weak domain condition that all agents’ sets of possible valuations share at least four common valuations satisfying a certain inequality. Moreover, we prove that this impossibility result is robust to any affine transformation of domains, and we examine this impossibility result when the set of agent’s possible valuations consists of finite integers.

Original language	English
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-021-00754-4
Publication status	Accepted/In press - 2021

Keywords

Indivisible good
Monetary transfer
Pareto efficiency
Restricted domain
Strategy-proofness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Statistics and Probability
Mathematics (miscellaneous)
Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Economics and Econometrics
Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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title = "Strategy-proof and Pareto efficient allocation of indivisible goods: general impossibility domains",

abstract = "We consider the problem of allocating several homogeneous indivisible goods when monetary transfers among agents are possible. We study the possibility of constructing strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanisms on restricted domains of agents{\textquoteright} valuation profiles. We show that there is no strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanism under the weak domain condition that all agents{\textquoteright} sets of possible valuations share at least four common valuations satisfying a certain inequality. Moreover, we prove that this impossibility result is robust to any affine transformation of domains, and we examine this impossibility result when the set of agent{\textquoteright}s possible valuations consists of finite integers.",

keywords = "Indivisible good, Monetary transfer, Pareto efficiency, Restricted domain, Strategy-proofness",

author = "Shinji Ohseto",

note = "Funding Information: We would like to thank an associate editor, two anonymous referees, Miki Kato, and Zhen Zhao for helpful suggestions and detailed comments. This research was partially supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant number 17K03614. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer-Verlag GmbH, DE part of Springer Nature.",

year = "2021",

doi = "10.1007/s00182-021-00754-4",

language = "English",

journal = "International Journal of Game Theory",

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T1 - Strategy-proof and Pareto efficient allocation of indivisible goods

T2 - general impossibility domains

AU - Ohseto, Shinji

N1 - Funding Information: We would like to thank an associate editor, two anonymous referees, Miki Kato, and Zhen Zhao for helpful suggestions and detailed comments. This research was partially supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant number 17K03614. Publisher Copyright: © 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer-Verlag GmbH, DE part of Springer Nature.

PY - 2021

Y1 - 2021

N2 - We consider the problem of allocating several homogeneous indivisible goods when monetary transfers among agents are possible. We study the possibility of constructing strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanisms on restricted domains of agents’ valuation profiles. We show that there is no strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanism under the weak domain condition that all agents’ sets of possible valuations share at least four common valuations satisfying a certain inequality. Moreover, we prove that this impossibility result is robust to any affine transformation of domains, and we examine this impossibility result when the set of agent’s possible valuations consists of finite integers.

AB - We consider the problem of allocating several homogeneous indivisible goods when monetary transfers among agents are possible. We study the possibility of constructing strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanisms on restricted domains of agents’ valuation profiles. We show that there is no strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanism under the weak domain condition that all agents’ sets of possible valuations share at least four common valuations satisfying a certain inequality. Moreover, we prove that this impossibility result is robust to any affine transformation of domains, and we examine this impossibility result when the set of agent’s possible valuations consists of finite integers.

KW - Indivisible good

KW - Monetary transfer

KW - Pareto efficiency

KW - Restricted domain

KW - Strategy-proofness

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JO - International Journal of Game Theory

JF - International Journal of Game Theory

SN - 0020-7276

ER -

Strategy-proof and Pareto efficient allocation of indivisible goods: general impossibility domains

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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