Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies: A note

Rajat Deb, Shinji Ohseto

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Serizawa [3] characterized the set of strategy-proof, individually rational, no exploitative, and non-bossy social choice functions in economies with pure public goods. He left an open question whether non-bossiness is necessary for his characterization. We will prove that non-bossiness is implied by the other three axioms in his characterization.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)685-689
Number of pages5
JournalEconomic Theory
Volume14
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1999 Nov
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Individual rationality
  • Non-bossiness
  • Social choice function
  • Strategy-proofness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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