TY - JOUR
T1 - Strategy-proof and fair reallocation with single-peaked preferences
AU - Zhao, Zhen
AU - Ohseto, Shinji
N1 - Funding Information:
We would like to thank an associate editor, two anonymous referees, Yuji Fujinaka, Kazuhiko Hashimoto, Osamu Hayashida, Kosuke Hirose, Tomoyuki Kamo, Toshiji Miyakawa, Akitoshi Muramoto, Shohei Tamura and Takuma Wakayama for helpful suggestions and comments. This research was partially supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 21K01384.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.
PY - 2022/5
Y1 - 2022/5
N2 - We consider the strategy-proof rules for reallocating individual endowments of an infinitely divisible good when agents’ preferences are single-peaked. In social endowment setting, the seminal work established by Sprumont (Econometrica 59:509–519, 1991) proves that the uniform rule is the unique one which satisfies strategy-proofness, efficiency, and envy-freeness. However, the uniform rule is not so appealing in our model since it disregards the differences in individual endowments. In other words, the uniform rule is not individually rational. In this paper, we propose a new rule named the uniform proportion rule. First, we prove that it is the unique rule which satisfies strategy-proofness, efficiency, and envy-freeness on proportion and we show that it is individually rational. Then, we show that our rule is indeed a member of the class of sequential allotment rules characterized by Barberà et al. (Games Econ Behav 18:1–21, 1997).
AB - We consider the strategy-proof rules for reallocating individual endowments of an infinitely divisible good when agents’ preferences are single-peaked. In social endowment setting, the seminal work established by Sprumont (Econometrica 59:509–519, 1991) proves that the uniform rule is the unique one which satisfies strategy-proofness, efficiency, and envy-freeness. However, the uniform rule is not so appealing in our model since it disregards the differences in individual endowments. In other words, the uniform rule is not individually rational. In this paper, we propose a new rule named the uniform proportion rule. First, we prove that it is the unique rule which satisfies strategy-proofness, efficiency, and envy-freeness on proportion and we show that it is individually rational. Then, we show that our rule is indeed a member of the class of sequential allotment rules characterized by Barberà et al. (Games Econ Behav 18:1–21, 1997).
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U2 - 10.1007/s00355-021-01374-3
DO - 10.1007/s00355-021-01374-3
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85118975808
VL - 58
SP - 791
EP - 800
JO - Social Choice and Welfare
JF - Social Choice and Welfare
SN - 0176-1714
IS - 4
ER -