Strategy-proof and efficient allocation of an indivisible good on finitely restricted preference domains

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17 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider allocation mechanisms in economies with a single indivisible good and money. First, we show that there is no strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanism on some preference domains which consist of a sufficiently large but finite number of quasi-linear preferences. Second, we show that there is no strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and equally compensatory mechanism on arbitrary preference domains which consist of more than three quasi-linear preferences.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)365-374
Number of pages10
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume29
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2000 Nov
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Domain restriction
  • Efficiency
  • Strategy-proofness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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