Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with an indivisible good

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15 Citations (Scopus)


We consider economies with a single indivisible good and money. We characterize the set of mechanisms that satisfy strategy-proofness, individual rationality, equal compensation, and demand monotonicity. There are three types of mechanisms which have the following properties: (i) they determine the allocation of monetary compensation depending on who receives the indivisible good; (ii) they allocate the indivisible good to one of the pre-specified (one or two) agent(s); and (iii) they disregard preferences of agents other than the pre-specified agent(s). This result implies that the presence of an indivisible good induces serious asymmetry in mechanisms.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)121-136
Number of pages16
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 1999 Jan 1
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics


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