Reputation acquisition in imperfect financial markets

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper incorporates financial market imperfections into the Diamond (1989) model where reputation concerns limit managers' excessive risk-taking. We show that the reputational discipline collapses because of an increase in pledgeability and a decline in interest rates over time.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)76-78
Number of pages3
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume139
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2016 Feb 1
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • G01
  • G11
  • Low interest rates
  • Pledgeability
  • Reputation
  • Risk-taking

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Reputation acquisition in imperfect financial markets'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this