Procedural fairness in ultimatum bargaining: Effects of interactional fairness and formal procedure on respondents' reactions to unequal offers

Mitsuteru Fukuno, Ken Ichi Ohbuchi

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    3 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Ninety-nine Japanese students received one of three offers in an ultimatum bargaining scenario: unfavorable and unequal; equal; or favorable but unequal. These offers were determined by either the other participant or by a computerized lottery. We also manipulated the arbitrariness of the role assignment procedure. Participants perceived the intentional small offer as more unfair in the interactional sense than the unintentional small offer, while they perceived the same offers as unfair in the distributive sense, regardless of intentionality. The intentional small offer was more likely to be rejected than the unintentional small offer, Participants perceived the arbitrary procedure of the role assignment as highly unfair, whereas the difference of arbitrariness in role assignment procedures had no significant impact on their reactions to the offer. Acceptance of the offer was strongly determined by interactional fairness, as well as by distributive fairness, and these types of fairness were influenced by different situational characteristics, such as intentionality, the size of the offer, and the equality of the offer.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)152-161
    Number of pages10
    JournalJapanese Psychological Research
    Volume45
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2003 Sep

    Keywords

    • Distributive fairness
    • Formal procedure
    • Interactional fairness
    • Ultimatum bargaining

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Psychology(all)

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