Power noise measurements of cryptographic VLSI circuits regarding side-channel information leakage

Daisuke Fujimoto, Noriyuki Miura, Makoto Nagata, Yu-Ichi Hayashi, Naofumi Homma, Takafumi Aoki, Yohei Hori, Toshihiro Katashita, Kazuo Sakiyama, Thanh Ha Le, Julien Bringer, Pirouz Bazargan-Sabet, Shivam Bhasin, Jean Luc Danger

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Power supply noise waveforms within cryptographic VLSI circuits in a 65 nm CMOS technology are captured by using an onchip voltage waveform monitor (OCM). The waveforms exhibit the correlation of dynamic voltage drops to internal logical activities during Advance Encryption Standard (AES) processing, and causes side-channel information leakage regarding to secret key bytes. Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) is the method of an attack extracting such information leakage from the waveforms. The frequency components of power supply noise contributing the leakage are shown to be localized in an extremely low frequency region. The level of information leakage is strongly associated with the size of increment of dynamic voltage drops against the Hamming distance in the AES processing. The time window of significant importance where the leakage most likely happens is clearly designated within a single clock cycle in the final stage of AES processing. The on-chip power supply noise measurements unveil the facts about side-channel information leakage behind the traditional CPA with on-board sensing of power supply current through a resistor of 1 ohm.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)272-279
Number of pages8
JournalIEICE Transactions on Electronics
VolumeE97-C
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014 Jan 1

Keywords

  • Advance encryption standard
  • Correlation power analysis
  • Information leakage
  • Side-channel attack

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Electronic, Optical and Magnetic Materials
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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  • Cite this

    Fujimoto, D., Miura, N., Nagata, M., Hayashi, Y-I., Homma, N., Aoki, T., Hori, Y., Katashita, T., Sakiyama, K., Le, T. H., Bringer, J., Bazargan-Sabet, P., Bhasin, S., & Danger, J. L. (2014). Power noise measurements of cryptographic VLSI circuits regarding side-channel information leakage. IEICE Transactions on Electronics, E97-C(4), 272-279. https://doi.org/10.1587/transele.E97.C.272