On Vickrey-type auction procedures

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Although a Vickrey-type auction provides a dominant strategy for every buyer (bidder) even in a multi-item setting, a seller can manipulate the auction. This paper attempts to show that the manipulation can be avoided by suitably modifying the initial price vector.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)71-75
Number of pages5
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume51
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1996 Apr
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Avoiding manipulations by sellers
  • Vickery-type auction

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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