On the incentive properties of multi-item auctions

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13 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In a market of indivisible objects where a buyer consumes at most one object, the buyer-optimal auction is a multi-item generalization of Vickrey's second-price auction. If the optimal auction is formulated as a strategic game, it is well-known that it satisfies good incentive properties, i.e., the honest strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium, a unique perfect equilibrium and a dominant strategy equilibrium. For each of the three incentive properties, it is shown that the optimal auction is a unique auction satisfying the property. The uniqueness results are derived in a general setting with budget constraints and non-linear utilities.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-19
Number of pages19
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume27
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1998 May
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Dominant strategy equilibrium
  • Multi-item auctions
  • Nash equilibrium
  • Perfect equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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