Non-invasive EMI-based fault injection attack against cryptographic modules

Yu-Ichi Hayashi, Naofumi Homma, Takeshi Sugawara, Takaaki Mizuki, Takafumi Aoki, Hideaki Sone

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

19 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper, we introduce a new type of intentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI) which causes information leakage in electrical devices without disrupting their operation or damaging their physical structure. Such IEMI could pose a severe threat to a large number of electrical devices with cryptographic modules since it can be used for performing fault injection attacks, which in turn allows for obtaining faulty outputs (i.e., ciphertexts) from cryptographic modules and exploiting them to reveal information about secret keys. Such faulty outputs are usually generated by inducing faults into target modules through modification or invasion of the modules themselves. In contrast, IEMI-based fault injection can be performed on the target modules from a distance by using an off-the-shelf injection probe without leaving any hard evidence of the attack. We demonstrate fault injection attacks based on the above IEMI through experiments using an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) module implemented on a standard evaluation board (SASEBO). The experimental results indicate that generating effective faults is feasible and, therefore, such IEMI presents a tangible threat to many existing electrical devices and systems that use cryptographic modules for secure communication and transactions.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationEMC 2011 - Proceedings
Subtitle of host publication2011 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility
Pages763-767
Number of pages5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2011 Oct 24
Event2011 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility, EMC 2011 - Long Beach, CA, United States
Duration: 2011 Aug 142011 Aug 19

Publication series

NameIEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility
ISSN (Print)1077-4076

Other

Other2011 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility, EMC 2011
CountryUnited States
CityLong Beach, CA
Period11/8/1411/8/19

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Condensed Matter Physics
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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  • Cite this

    Hayashi, Y-I., Homma, N., Sugawara, T., Mizuki, T., Aoki, T., & Sone, H. (2011). Non-invasive EMI-based fault injection attack against cryptographic modules. In EMC 2011 - Proceedings: 2011 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility (pp. 763-767). [6038411] (IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility). https://doi.org/10.1109/ISEMC.2011.6038411