Network games with and without synchroneity

Ahmad Termimi Ab Ghani, Kazuyuki Tanaka

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

To formulate a network security problem, Mavronicholas et al. [6] introduced a strategic game on an undirected graph whose nodes are exposed to infection by attackers, and whose edges are protected by a defender. Subsequently, MedSalem et al. [9] generalized the model so that they have many defenders instead of a single defender. Then in [1], we introduced a new network game with the roles of players interchanged, and obtained a graph-theoretic characterization of its pure Nash equilibria. In this paper we study mixed Nash equilibria for stochastic strategies in this new game, and then we generalize our network game to an asynchronous game, where two players repeatedly execute simultaneous games. Although the asynchronous game is formally an infinite game, we show that it has a stable solution by reducing it to a finite game.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationDecision and Game Theory for Security - Second International Conference, GameSec 2011, Proceedings
Pages87-103
Number of pages17
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2011
Event2nd International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2011 - College Park, MD, United States
Duration: 2011 Nov 142011 Nov 15

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume7037 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Other

Other2nd International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2011
CountryUnited States
CityCollege Park, MD
Period11/11/1411/11/15

Keywords

  • Asynchronous Game
  • Nash Equilibrium
  • Network Game

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

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