TY - GEN
T1 - Network games with and without synchroneity
AU - Ghani, Ahmad Termimi Ab
AU - Tanaka, Kazuyuki
PY - 2011
Y1 - 2011
N2 - To formulate a network security problem, Mavronicholas et al. [6] introduced a strategic game on an undirected graph whose nodes are exposed to infection by attackers, and whose edges are protected by a defender. Subsequently, MedSalem et al. [9] generalized the model so that they have many defenders instead of a single defender. Then in [1], we introduced a new network game with the roles of players interchanged, and obtained a graph-theoretic characterization of its pure Nash equilibria. In this paper we study mixed Nash equilibria for stochastic strategies in this new game, and then we generalize our network game to an asynchronous game, where two players repeatedly execute simultaneous games. Although the asynchronous game is formally an infinite game, we show that it has a stable solution by reducing it to a finite game.
AB - To formulate a network security problem, Mavronicholas et al. [6] introduced a strategic game on an undirected graph whose nodes are exposed to infection by attackers, and whose edges are protected by a defender. Subsequently, MedSalem et al. [9] generalized the model so that they have many defenders instead of a single defender. Then in [1], we introduced a new network game with the roles of players interchanged, and obtained a graph-theoretic characterization of its pure Nash equilibria. In this paper we study mixed Nash equilibria for stochastic strategies in this new game, and then we generalize our network game to an asynchronous game, where two players repeatedly execute simultaneous games. Although the asynchronous game is formally an infinite game, we show that it has a stable solution by reducing it to a finite game.
KW - Asynchronous Game
KW - Nash Equilibrium
KW - Network Game
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=81755178400&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=81755178400&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-642-25280-8_9
DO - 10.1007/978-3-642-25280-8_9
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:81755178400
SN - 9783642252792
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 87
EP - 103
BT - Decision and Game Theory for Security - Second International Conference, GameSec 2011, Proceedings
T2 - 2nd International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2011
Y2 - 14 November 2011 through 15 November 2011
ER -