Indirect reciprocity is sensitive to costs of information transfer

Shinsuke Suzuki, Hiromichi Kimura

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

32 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

How natural selection can promote cooperative or altruistic behavior is a fundamental question in biological and social sciences. One of the persuasive mechanisms is "indirect reciprocity," working through reputation: cooperative behavior can prevail because the behavior builds the donor's good reputation and then s/he receives some reciprocal benefits from someone else in the community. However, an important piece missed in the previous studies is that the reputation-building process requires substantial cognitive abilities such as communication skills, potentially causing a loss of biological fitness. Here, by mathematical analyses and individual-based computer simulations, we show that natural selection never favors indirect reciprocal cooperation in the presence of the cost of reputation building, regardless of the cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation or moral assessment rules (social norms). Our results highlight the importance of considering the cost of high-level cognitive abilities in studies of the evolution of humans' and animals' social behavior.

Original languageEnglish
Article number1435
JournalScientific reports
Volume3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Indirect reciprocity is sensitive to costs of information transfer'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this