Implementing egalitarian-equivalent allocation of indivisible goods on restricted domains

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14 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study the problem of allocating several units of homogeneous indivisible goods when monetary compensations are possible. First, we show that there is no strategy-proof, budget balanced, and egalitarian-equivalent mechanism even on extremely restricted preference domains. Next, we present two characterizations of strategy-proof and decision-efficient mechanisms that satisfy a stronger version of egalitarian-equivalence on preference domains bounded above. These characterizations tell us a trade-off between strategy-proofness and Pareto efficiency, and a relationship with strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms. Finally, we prove that no egalitarian-equivalent mechanism is Nash implementable even on extremely restricted preference domains.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)659-670
Number of pages12
JournalEconomic Theory
Volume23
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 2004 Apr 1
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Egalitarian-equivalence
  • Indivisible goods
  • Nash implementation
  • Strategy-proofness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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