Identification of information leakage spots on a cryptographic device with an RSA processor

Olivier Meynard, Yu-Ichi Hayashi, Naofumi Homma, Sylvain Guilley, Jean Luc Danger

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper investigates a relationship between the intensity of EM radiation and that of EM information leakage on a cryptographic device. For this purpose, we first observe an EM-field map on a cryptographic device by an EM scanning system, and then perform simple electromagnetic analysis (SEMA) experiments at some distinct points on the device including over the module. The target device considered here is a Side-channel Attack Standard Evaluation Board (SASEBO) with an RSA hardware implemented in an FPGA. Through the experiment, we demonstrate which points are effective for EM information leakage. The result suggests that the position of greatest EM intensity is not always the most effective point in EM information leakage.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationEMC 2011 - Proceedings
Subtitle of host publication2011 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility
Pages773-778
Number of pages6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2011 Oct 24
Event2011 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility, EMC 2011 - Long Beach, CA, United States
Duration: 2011 Aug 142011 Aug 19

Publication series

NameIEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility
ISSN (Print)1077-4076

Other

Other2011 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility, EMC 2011
CountryUnited States
CityLong Beach, CA
Period11/8/1411/8/19

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Condensed Matter Physics
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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