High-resolution phase-based waveform matching and its application to side-channel attacks

Naofumi Homma, Sei Nagashima, Takeshi Sugawara, Takafumi Aoki, Akashi Satoh

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper presents an enhanced side-channel attack using a phase-based waveform matching technique. Conventionally, side-channel attacks such as Simple Power Analysis (SPA) and Differential Power Analysis (DPA) capture signal waveforms (e.g., power traces) with a trigger signal or a system clock, and use a statistical analysis of the waveforms to reduce noise and to retrieve secret information. However, the waveform data often includes displacement errors, and this degrades the accuracy of the statistical analysis. The use of a Phase-Only Correlation (POC) technique makes it possible to estimate the displacements between the signal waveforms with higher resolution than the sampling resolution. The accuracy of side-channel attacks can be enhanced using the POC-based matching method. Also, a popular DPA countermeasure of creating distorted waveforms with random delays can be defeated by our method. In this paper, we demonstrate the advantages of the proposed method in comparison with conventional approaches of experimental DPA and Differential ElectroMagnetic Analysis (DEMA) against DES software and hardware implementations.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)193-202
Number of pages10
JournalIEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
VolumeE91-A
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2008

Keywords

  • Cryptographic module
  • DEMA
  • DPA
  • Phase-only correlation
  • Side-channel attacks
  • Waveform matching

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Signal Processing
  • Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Applied Mathematics

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