Abstract
We consider deterministic evolutionary dynamics under imitative revision protocols. We allow agents to have different aspiration levels in the imitative protocols where their aspiration levels are not observable to other agents. We show that the distribution of strategies becomes statistically independent of the aspiration level eventually in the long run. Thus, long-run properties of homogeneous imitative dynamics hold as well, despite heterogeneity in aspiration levels.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 562-577 |
Number of pages | 16 |
Journal | Journal of Economic Theory |
Volume | 154 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2014 Nov 1 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Aspiration level
- Imitation
- Learning
- Multiple populations
- Wright manifold
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics