Evolutionary dynamics in multitasking environments

Ryoji Sawa, Dai Zusai

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We formulate the best response dynamic in a multitasking environment; while agents engage in multiple games concurrently, an agent can switch her action in only one of the games upon receipt of a revision opportunity. The choice of the game in which to revise an action makes the multitasking dynamic behave differently from standard evolutionary dynamics. The timing of revisions in a game becomes endogenous, which causes the transition of the action distribution in each game to depend on those in other games. Despite such complexity, we verify the global stability of the Nash equilibrium set in potential and contractive games as well as the local stability of a regular evolutionary stable state. We also show that the equilibrium to which the multitasking dynamic converges may depend on the task choice rules.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)288-308
Number of pages21
JournalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Volume166
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2019 Oct
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Best response dynamics
  • Bounded rationality
  • Evolution
  • Evolutionary stable state
  • Multitasking
  • Stability of the Nash equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

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