Enhancing reactive countermeasure against em attacks with low overhead

Daisuke Ishihata, Naofumi Homma, Yu Ichi Hayashi, Noriyuki Miura, Daisuke Fujimoto, Makoto Nagata, Takafumi Aoki

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper proposes a method for improving Electromagnetic (EM) attack sensor precision for countering a wider range of EM attacks on cryptographic modules. During an attack, an EM attack sensor determines the proximity of a probe to an LSI chip by detecting a change in the mutual inductance between the probe and the LSI chip from the shift in the oscillation frequency of the LC oscillator of the sensor. The subsequent would-be attack is thwarted by instantaneous detection of the proximity of the probe. We show that smaller oscillation frequency shifts can be detected by extending the time required for the detection process, and demonstrate that extending the time enables attacks to be detected even when they are coming from the back surface of the LSI chip, which was earlier difficult to achieve. We then examine the possibility of operating the crypto core and sensor simultaneously as a method for reducing the performance overheads of the proposed system. Through evaluation experiments, we show that the simultaneous operation of the crypto core and sensor has no significant effect on the precision of probe detection. Furthermore, we discuss an alternative method for improving the detection sensitivity by a time-to-digital converter without extending the detection process time.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2017 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility, Signal and Power Integrity, EMCSI 2017 - Proceedings
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages399-404
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9781538622308
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017 Oct 20
Event2017 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility, Signal and Power Integrity, EMCSI 2017 - Washington, United States
Duration: 2017 Aug 72017 Aug 11

Publication series

NameIEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility
ISSN (Print)1077-4076
ISSN (Electronic)2158-1118

Other

Other2017 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility, Signal and Power Integrity, EMCSI 2017
CountryUnited States
CityWashington
Period17/8/717/8/11

Keywords

  • EM analysis attack
  • EM attack sensor
  • Side-channel attack
  • countermeasure technology

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Condensed Matter Physics
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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