Electromagnetic information leakage for side-channel analysis of cryptographic modules

Naofumi Homma; Takafumi Aoki; Akashi Satoh

doi:10.1109/ISEMC.2010.5711254

Electromagnetic information leakage for side-channel analysis of cryptographic modules

Naofumi Homma, Takafumi Aoki, Akashi Satoh

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

10 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A new class of physical attacks against cryptographic modules, which is called the side-channel attack, is now drawing much attention. Side-channel attacks exploit information leakage from a physical implementation, such as power consumption and electro-magnetic (EM) radiation. This paper presents an overview of the recent trends in side-channel attacks, including EM analysis attacks, and related activities in the security evaluation of cryptographic modules.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility, EMC 2010 - Final Program
Pages	97-102
Number of pages	6
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/ISEMC.2010.5711254
Publication status	Published - 2010 Dec 1
Event	2010 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility, EMC 2010 - Fort Lauderdale, FL, United States Duration: 2010 Jul 25 → 2010 Jul 30

Publication series

Name	IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility
ISSN (Print)	1077-4076

Other

Other	2010 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility, EMC 2010
Country	United States
City	Fort Lauderdale, FL
Period	10/7/25 → 10/7/30

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Condensed Matter Physics
Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Access to Document

10.1109/ISEMC.2010.5711254

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Cite this

Electromagnetic information leakage for side-channel analysis of cryptographic modules. / Homma, Naofumi ; Aoki, Takafumi; Satoh, Akashi.

IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility, EMC 2010 - Final Program. 2010. p. 97-102 5711254 (IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Homma, N , Aoki, T & Satoh, A 2010, Electromagnetic information leakage for side-channel analysis of cryptographic modules. in IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility, EMC 2010 - Final Program., 5711254, IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility, pp. 97-102, 2010 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility, EMC 2010, Fort Lauderdale, FL, United States, 10/7/25. https://doi.org/10.1109/ISEMC.2010.5711254

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