Electromagnetic information leakage for side-channel analysis of cryptographic modules

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

10 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A new class of physical attacks against cryptographic modules, which is called the side-channel attack, is now drawing much attention. Side-channel attacks exploit information leakage from a physical implementation, such as power consumption and electro-magnetic (EM) radiation. This paper presents an overview of the recent trends in side-channel attacks, including EM analysis attacks, and related activities in the security evaluation of cryptographic modules.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationIEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility, EMC 2010 - Final Program
Pages97-102
Number of pages6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2010 Dec 1
Event2010 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility, EMC 2010 - Fort Lauderdale, FL, United States
Duration: 2010 Jul 252010 Jul 30

Publication series

NameIEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility
ISSN (Print)1077-4076

Other

Other2010 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility, EMC 2010
CountryUnited States
CityFort Lauderdale, FL
Period10/7/2510/7/30

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Condensed Matter Physics
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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