TY - GEN
T1 - Electromagnetic information leakage for side-channel analysis of cryptographic modules
AU - Homma, Naofumi
AU - Aoki, Takafumi
AU - Satoh, Akashi
PY - 2010/12/1
Y1 - 2010/12/1
N2 - A new class of physical attacks against cryptographic modules, which is called the side-channel attack, is now drawing much attention. Side-channel attacks exploit information leakage from a physical implementation, such as power consumption and electro-magnetic (EM) radiation. This paper presents an overview of the recent trends in side-channel attacks, including EM analysis attacks, and related activities in the security evaluation of cryptographic modules.
AB - A new class of physical attacks against cryptographic modules, which is called the side-channel attack, is now drawing much attention. Side-channel attacks exploit information leakage from a physical implementation, such as power consumption and electro-magnetic (EM) radiation. This paper presents an overview of the recent trends in side-channel attacks, including EM analysis attacks, and related activities in the security evaluation of cryptographic modules.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=79952424034&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=79952424034&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/ISEMC.2010.5711254
DO - 10.1109/ISEMC.2010.5711254
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:79952424034
SN - 9781424463053
T3 - IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility
SP - 97
EP - 102
BT - IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility, EMC 2010 - Final Program
T2 - 2010 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility, EMC 2010
Y2 - 25 July 2010 through 30 July 2010
ER -