Dynamic voluntary provision of public goods and optimal steady-state subsidies

Akihiko Yanase

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    7 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    This paper examines a differential game model of voluntary provision of a public good in which private agents' contributions accumulate over time and derives subsidy rules that achieve the socially efficient steady state. It is shown that the optimal subsidy rule is a simple one when agents use the open-loop strategy, while under Markovian strategies it intricately depends on the parameters of the economy.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)171-179
    Number of pages9
    JournalJournal of Public Economic Theory
    Volume8
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2006 Dec 1

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Finance
    • Sociology and Political Science
    • Economics and Econometrics

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