Diffusional Side-Channel Leakage from Unrolled Lightweight Block Ciphers: A Case Study of Power Analysis on PRINCE

Ville Yli-Mayry, Rei Ueno, Noriyuki Miura, Makoto Nagata, Shivam Bhasin, Yves Mathieu, Tarik Graba, Jean Luc Danger, Naofumi Homma

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This study investigates a new side-channel leakage observed in the inner rounds of an unrolled hardware implementation of block ciphers in a chosen-input attack scenario. The side-channel leakage occurs in the first round and it can be observed in the later inner rounds because it arises from path activation bias caused by the difference between two consecutive inputs. Therefore, a new attack that exploits the leakage is possible even for unrolled implementations equipped with countermeasures (masking and/or deglitchers that separate the circuit in terms of glitch propagation) in the round involving the leakage. We validate the existence of such a unique side-channel leakage through a set of experiments with a fully unrolled PRINCE cipher hardware, implemented on a field-programmable gate array (FPGA). In addition, we verify the validity and evaluate the hardware cost of a countermeasure for the unrolled implementation, namely the Threshold Implementation (TI) countermeasure.

Original languageEnglish
Article number9238027
Pages (from-to)1351-1364
Number of pages14
JournalIEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Volume16
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2021

Keywords

  • Low-latency block ciphers
  • PRINCE
  • countermeasures
  • side-channel attacks
  • unrolled implementation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality
  • Computer Networks and Communications

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