Abstract
Up to now, results on the existence of Nash equilibrium have required either continuity of payoff functions or compactness of strategy sets. However, in the arbitration games FOA and DOA, neither condition is satisfied. This paper first gives a new existence result for a general game. The result is then applied to the symmetric arbitration games FOA and DOA. The conclusions of this paper generalize the main result of Zeng, Nakamura and Ibaraki (1996), that DOA leads to a convergence of offers but FOA does not. International Federation of Operational Research Societies 2001.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 511-521 |
Number of pages | 11 |
Journal | International Transactions in Operational Research |
Volume | 8 |
Issue number | 5 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2001 Jan 1 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Convergence
- Double-offer arbitration (DOA)
- Final-offer arbitration (FOA)
- Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Business and International Management
- Computer Science Applications
- Strategy and Management
- Management Science and Operations Research
- Management of Technology and Innovation