Characterizations of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms for Excludable versus Nonexcludable Public Projects

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

First, we characterize "the unanimous mechanisms" as the set of strategy-proof, individually rational, and citizen sovereign mechanisms for the provision of a nonexcludable public project. Second, we characterize "the largest unanimous mechanisms" as the set of strategy-proof, individually rational, demand-monotonic, and access-independent mechanisms for the provision of an excludable public project. Comparing these two classes of mechanisms, we conclude that admitting partial exclusion always improves efficiency under the incentive compatibility constraint. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D71, D82, H41.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)51-66
Number of pages16
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume32
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2000 Jul 1
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Strategy-proof; mechanism; excludability

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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