Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods

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34 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods when monetary compensations are possible. First, we characterize the set of strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms. Second, we identify the Pareto undominated subset in the set of strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms. These characterizations can be interpreted as envy-free selections of Groves mechanisms.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)111-121
Number of pages11
JournalEconomic Theory
Volume29
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2006 Sep 1

Keywords

  • Envy-freeness
  • Groves mechanisms
  • Indivisible goods
  • Strategy-proofness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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