TY - JOUR
T1 - Bottleneck Congestion and Distribution of Work Start Times
T2 - The Economics of Staggered Work Hours Revisited
AU - Takayama, Yuki
N1 - Funding Information:
I am grateful to Takashi Akamatsu, Richard Connors, Takamasa Iryo, Masao Kuwahara, Kentaro Wada, Yuichiro Yoshida, and three anonymous referees for their helpful comments and discussions. This research was supported by JSPS Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B) 24760415 and 15K18136. Any remaining errors are my own.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2015 The Authors. © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
PY - 2015
Y1 - 2015
N2 - Since the seminal work of Henderson (1981), a number of studies examined the effect of staggered work hours by analyzing models of work start time choice that consider the trade-off between negative congestion externalities and positive production externalities. However, these studies described traffic congestion using flow congestion models. This study develops a model of work start time choice with bottleneck congestion and discloses the intrinsic properties of the model. To this end, this study extends Henderson's model to incorporate bottleneck congestion. By utilizing the properties of a potential game, we characterize equilibrium and optimal distributions of work start times. We also show that Pigouvian tax/subsidy policies generally yield multiple equilibria and that the first-best optimum must be a stable equilibrium under Pigouvian policies, whereas the second-best optimum in which policymakers cannot eliminate queuing congestion can be unstable.
AB - Since the seminal work of Henderson (1981), a number of studies examined the effect of staggered work hours by analyzing models of work start time choice that consider the trade-off between negative congestion externalities and positive production externalities. However, these studies described traffic congestion using flow congestion models. This study develops a model of work start time choice with bottleneck congestion and discloses the intrinsic properties of the model. To this end, this study extends Henderson's model to incorporate bottleneck congestion. By utilizing the properties of a potential game, we characterize equilibrium and optimal distributions of work start times. We also show that Pigouvian tax/subsidy policies generally yield multiple equilibria and that the first-best optimum must be a stable equilibrium under Pigouvian policies, whereas the second-best optimum in which policymakers cannot eliminate queuing congestion can be unstable.
KW - Pigouvian policies
KW - bottleneck congestion
KW - potential game
KW - production effects
KW - stability
KW - staggered work hours
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U2 - 10.1016/j.trpro.2015.06.026
DO - 10.1016/j.trpro.2015.06.026
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84959340619
VL - 7
SP - 499
EP - 518
JO - Transportation Research Procedia
JF - Transportation Research Procedia
SN - 2352-1457
ER -
