Analysis of em emission from cryptographic devices

Hideaki Sone, Yu-Ichi Hayashi, Takaaki Mizuki

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Electromagnetic information leakage is an attack against secret information in an information-processing circuit, and realized by observing electromagnetic radiation around the circuit. When a cryptographic module works, electrical fluctuation in it can be conducted to peripheral circuits by ground bounce, resulting in electromagnetic radiation. The authors demonstrate the mechanism through experiments with an FPGA board which processes the standard cipher AES (Advanced Encryption Standard). Measurement of electromagnetic radiation from a power cable showed that correlation electromagnetic analysis (CEMA) reveals the secret keys. The leakage is possible even if voltage regulators are placed as a disturbing factor between the module and the measurement points. Circuit-level countermeasures against CEMA are also discussed, and an information suppression technique is proposed by the authors.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2014 31th URSI General Assembly and Scientific Symposium, URSI GASS 2014
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ISBN (Electronic)9781467352253
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014 Jan 1
Event31st General Assembly and Scientific Symposium of the International Union of Radio Science, URSI GASS 2014 - Beijing, China
Duration: 2014 Aug 162014 Aug 23

Other

Other31st General Assembly and Scientific Symposium of the International Union of Radio Science, URSI GASS 2014
CountryChina
CityBeijing
Period14/8/1614/8/23

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Computer Networks and Communications

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