An amendment to final-offer arbitration

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Abstract

Final-offer arbitration (FOA) was proposed to settle a dispute between two disputants. Although FOA was proposed to induce two disputants to reach an agreements by themselves, FOA fails to achieve the fulfilment, when disputants have incomplete information about the arbitrator'S notion of a fair settlement. This paper proposes a new arbitration procedure, which is a simple amendment to FOA that lets the arbitration settlement be determined by the loser'S offer if the offers diverge. We show that the offers converge in a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium without any additional condition. We also provide two methods to prevent an extreme arbitration result, in case the offers do not converge for some reasons.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)233-238
Number of pages6
JournalProceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics
Volume6
Publication statusPublished - 2002 Dec 1
Externally publishedYes
Event2002 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics - Yasmine Hammamet, Tunisia
Duration: 2002 Oct 62002 Oct 9

Keywords

  • Amended FOA (AFOA)
  • Arbitration
  • Dispute
  • Final-offer arbitration (FOA)

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Hardware and Architecture

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