Aggregating quasi-transitive preferences: A note

Dan Qin

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


To examine the consequences of allowing individual to violate full rationality in collective decision making, this article discusses the possibility of aggregating quasi-transitive preferences in the Arrovian framework. Quasi-transitive valued aggregating functions are discussed and characterised. A characterisation of the weak Pareto extension rule is also achieved as a corollary.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)976-983
Number of pages8
JournalEconomics Bulletin
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 2014 Jan 1
Externally publishedYes


  • Preference aggregation
  • Quasi-transitivity
  • Veto power
  • Weak pareto extension rule

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)


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