Advanced analysis of faults injected through conducted intentional electromagnetic interferences

Laurent Sauvage, Jean Luc Danger, Sylvain Guilley, Naofumi Homma, Yu-Ichi Hayashi

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Experimental setups used in electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) tests can be used as platforms for fault injections. Injecting faults into equipment is a means for a malevolent attacker to extract secret information. In this paper, we first present an advanced setup, i.e., a setup with characteristics beyond the main international EMC standards. It performs more accurate measurements of the disturbance power, reducing the measurement error by 20.33 dB. Second, we propose an advanced analysis methodology allowing an attacker or a countermeasure designer to identify the disturbance frequency leading to the most powerful attack. As an illustration, the method is applied on an ASIC implementation of DES, providing a thorough characterization and classification of the generated faults. In this case, the most powerful attacks are performed when the disturbance has a frequency below 1 MHz. The threat has thus to be considered really serious, as generating such disturbance does not require a high budget.

Original languageEnglish
Article number6517267
Pages (from-to)589-596
Number of pages8
JournalIEEE Transactions on Electromagnetic Compatibility
Volume55
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013 May 22

Keywords

  • Conducted disturbances
  • electromagnetic compatibility
  • fault injection attack
  • information leakage
  • intentional electromagnetic interferences

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Atomic and Molecular Physics, and Optics
  • Condensed Matter Physics
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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