The purpose of this paper is to formalize the theory of conflicting division of labor as two-person Chicken game. As a preliminary for this purpose, we make it clear that the alternatives open to the mediating subject are leading and ruling and the alternatives open to the mediated subject are contesting and defending, and that the conflicting division of labor can be brought about if the mediating subject chooses leading and the mediated subject chooses contesting. But the conflicting division of labor is not always brought about. This means that the result (leading, contesting) is not always chosen by each players. Thus this game of conflicting division of labor is a game without dominant strategies. So we formalize this game as Chicken game. The conflicting division of labor is not brought about according to the ordinary rules of Chicken game. So we apply S. J. Brams' sequential game to the game of conflicting division of labor, which changes the rules of the game and the players' principles of behavior. And we analyze the mechanism which determines the success or failure of the conflicting division of labor by analyzing the cases such as “Tokyo Waste War” and “Problems of Exhaust Gas”.
- Chicken Game
- Conflicting Division of Labor
- Sequential Game
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
- Sociology and Political Science