α-Serial Mechanisms For The Provision Of An Excludable Public Good

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2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We present a new class of "α-serial mechanisms" for the provision of an excludable public good. Those mechanisms have a similar structure to the serial mechanism, but may let the non-consumers pay a positive cost. They inherit desirable properties such as anonymity, envy-freeness, Maskin monotonicity, and population monotonicity from the serial mechanism. We calculate the "maximal efficiency loss" and "maximal manipulation" of α-serial mechanisms and point out a trade-off between these two properties.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)507-516
Number of pages10
JournalJapanese Economic Review
Volume61
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2010 Dec 1

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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