TY - JOUR
T1 - α-Serial Mechanisms For The Provision Of An Excludable Public Good
AU - Ohseto, Shinji
N1 - Funding Information:
I would like to thank Satoko Okuyama and an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions and comments. Research was partially supported by a Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology in Japan.
PY - 2010/12
Y1 - 2010/12
N2 - We present a new class of "α-serial mechanisms" for the provision of an excludable public good. Those mechanisms have a similar structure to the serial mechanism, but may let the non-consumers pay a positive cost. They inherit desirable properties such as anonymity, envy-freeness, Maskin monotonicity, and population monotonicity from the serial mechanism. We calculate the "maximal efficiency loss" and "maximal manipulation" of α-serial mechanisms and point out a trade-off between these two properties.
AB - We present a new class of "α-serial mechanisms" for the provision of an excludable public good. Those mechanisms have a similar structure to the serial mechanism, but may let the non-consumers pay a positive cost. They inherit desirable properties such as anonymity, envy-freeness, Maskin monotonicity, and population monotonicity from the serial mechanism. We calculate the "maximal efficiency loss" and "maximal manipulation" of α-serial mechanisms and point out a trade-off between these two properties.
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U2 - 10.1111/j.1468-5876.2009.00496.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1468-5876.2009.00496.x
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:78649516332
VL - 61
SP - 507
EP - 516
JO - Japanese Economic Review
JF - Japanese Economic Review
SN - 1352-4739
IS - 4
ER -